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Introduction
A majority of the world's fallen political leaders are not defeated in popular elections (Blondel (1980) , p.198, Table 1 ). Of 1,028 leaders who reached high o ce between 1945 and 1976, 169 remained in o ce in 1976; of the 859 who had fallen from power, only 5% were defeated at election. By contrast, 20% of leadership turnovers were due to pressures such as a coup. Despite the paucity of examples of removal from o ce at election, the attention devoted to modeling coups d' etat and other non-democratic processes has been small compared with that devoted to \democratic" electoral processes. The objective of this paper is to understand the relation between changes in economic conditions and leadership turnover in non-democratic processes. We develop a dynamic model that accounts for the main stylized facts concerning leadership turnover. These are:
1. The probability of leadership turnover in any given year is inversely related to the length of time in o ce (Bienen and van de Walle (1991)).
2.
A high coup propensity in any given period is associated with low per capita lagged real GDP growth Poole (1990, 1992) ).
3. A high coup propensity in a given period is associated with low per capita lagged real investment (Gallego (1996) ).
4. Low risk of leadership turnover occurs in countries in which leaders are not elected (Bienen and van de Walle (1991) p. 80).
5. Lower risk of leadership turnover is associated with a smaller size of the group whose support is necessary for continued leadership (Blondel (1980) p. 220, 230).
We study an in nite-horizon model of an economy in which the leader is maintained in power by the support of a nite subgroup of economic agents, called kingmakers. In each period, the leader rst receives a xed payment, then observes the realization of an exogenous shock, and nally exerts costly e ort. The payo to each kingmaker depends positively on both the level of the shock and the leader's e ort. After observing the shock and the leader's e ort, the kingmakers decide individually whether or not to withdraw support from the leader. If the leader is overthrown, a new leader is chosen at random from among the kingmakers, and a member of the population at large is chosen to replace the promoted kingmaker. This model is consistent with the stylized facts 2, 3, 4, and 5 above. An extension of the model in which the dictator's type varies with the cost of exerting e ort is consistent with the ve stylized facts above.
The model draws on previous principal-agent models of both political competition and dictatorship that are based on Green and Porter 1 (1984) . The models in this literature assume, as we do, that the leader of a group provides costly e ort to maintain a public good that enhances the well-being of a subgroup. The subgroup can discipline the leader by withholding support. We depart from this literature in three ways: Subsequent leaders are chosen at random from the subgroup whose support is necessary for the leader's survival so that leadership turnover confers a bene t on a random member of the subgroup. In the literature, it is assumed that subsequent leaders are chosen from outside of the subgroup so that, in the absence of variable leader ability, the subgroup is indi erent between an old and new leader.
The subgroup is nite so that each member of the subgroup has a positive chance of being chosen the new leader and therefore may derive a bene t from leadership turnover.
Perfect monitoring exists. In the literature, e ort is monitored imperfectly. A belief commonly held in this literature is that in the presence of perfect monitoring, support for the agent is never withdrawn by the principal since the e cient level of e ort is exerted by the agent in equilibrium in response to a forcing contract. We show that this belief is incorrect under our rst two assumptions above. We assume that the principal can monitor the agent perfectly not because we believe that perfect monitoring occurs in reality. We do so in order to provide insights into the e ect our rst two assumptions above have on the principal-agent model used in the political economy literature. The predictions of our model are consistent with the stylized facts in the literature, and remain so in the presence of imperfect monitoring.
When the supply of future leaders is provided by a nite subgroup as in our model, leadership turnover serves two purposes. In common with the principalagent models in the political economy literature, one purpose of leadership turnover is to discipline the actions of the leader. Another purpose of leadership turnover in our model is to allow a member of the subgroup a chance to change status and thereby give up a ow of bene ts in order to receive the expected capital gain of a change in status. Even in the presence of perfect monitoring, leadership turnover allows a member of the subgroup a chance to change status in equilibrium.
The intuition for the fact that turnover occurs even in the presence of perfect monitoring is as follows. The payo to the members of the subgroup in any period depends positively on the level of the exogenous shock and on the e ort exerted by the agent. This implies that a given payo level in a period is maintained only if the e ort exerted by the agent increases as the level of the exogenous shock decreases. If the members of the subgroup decide to withdraw support from the leader then each member has a chance to change status and become the future leader and thereby receive the expected payo of a future leader. The expected payo to a future leader is independent of the current level of the exogenous shock. When deciding between staging a coup or not, the kingmakers compare the ow of bene ts to maintaining the status quo with the expected capital gain of a change in status. The ow of bene ts to a kingmaker of maintaining the status quo in a period is larger than the expected capital gain of a change in status if the leader's e ort is high enough given the level of the exogenous shock in the period. As the level of the exogenous shock decreases, the leader's e ort must increase in order to maintain support from the subgroup. Thus, the subgroup's reservation standard of e ort increases in the expected capital gain of a change in status and decreases with the level of the exogenous shock. By contrast, the leader's payo in a period decreases with e ort and is independent of the level of the exogenous shock in the period. The leader weighs the cost of providing e ort today with the bene t of remaining as leader tomorrow. The bene t of remaining as leader tomorrow depends on the kingmakers' strategy and on the future levels of the exogenous shock. Thus, the bene t of remaining as leader tomorrow is xed given the strategy of the kingmakers. Therefore the leader's reservation value of e ort is xed given the strategy of the kingmakers. In equilibrium, the leader meets the subgroup's variable reservation standard of e ort provided it is below the leader's reservation level. Otherwise, the leader exerts zero e ort. When the level of the exogenous shock is low enough, the subgroup's equilibrium reservation standard of e ort is larger than the leader's equilibrium reservation value. In this case, the leader exerts zero e ort and the subgroup withdraws support.
Related Literature
In the dictatorship model of O'Flaherty (1991), a dictator's strength in o ce depends on the support of a core group. In the absence of uncertainty, O'Flaherty nds that the dictator is never ousted. In the case of variable dictator ability, he obtains that dictators are either ousted in the rst period or rule forever 2 . Thus, O'Flaherty's turnover rate decreases from the rst period to the second but stays constant at zero forever after. By contrast, we provide a model in which a dictator's probability of turnover is consistent with the stylized facts on leadership turnover given above.
In a non-interactive optimization model of tinpot dictatorship, Wintrobe (1990) assumes that tinpot dictators minimize the costs of staying in power in order to continue to reap its bene ts. The aim of his paper is to explain the changes in repression that occur with changes in economic performance. Coups d' etat do not occur in his model.
In the electoral competition model of Ferejohn (1986) , an o ce holder observes the value of a random variable and then takes an action. Though the primitive assumptions of his model and ours are related, the aims di er. Ferejohn is interested in the ability of the electorate to control the o ce holder as a function of the competition between parties. By contrast, we are interested in the stochastic nature of leadership turnover as a function of both the economy and the number of kingmakers.
In an in nite horizon asymmetric information model of electoral competition, Banks and Sundaram (1993) consider a median voter who elects a candidate to perform a costly task. In common with the explanation proposed in Bienen and van der Walle (1991), Banks and Sundaram obtain that under variable leader ability, the probability of re-election increases with an incumbent's length of time in o ce. They are interested in how voters choose election rules to mitigate against the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Observable exogenous shocks have no e ect on leadership turnover. By contrast, we are interested in how the economy a ects non-electoral leadership turnover. If the data exhibit negative e ects of observable exogenous shocks on coups d' etat then our model can explain the phenomenon.
The Model
The model that we use is applicable to leadership turnover in a variety of groups. For example, our model has implications for political party leadership turnover since party leadership depends on support from the party caucus and future leaders are chosen from among a select group 3 . It also has implications for country dictatorship turnover since a newly installed dictator is invariably found to be a member of the subgroup of \kingmakers" who participated in the coup. We cast our model in the framework of a dictator and a subgroup of kingmakers. Luttwak (1979, p.35) argues that one precondition for a coup is the existence of a small, educated, well-fed elite in whose hands power lies. He states (p.38) that the bene ts of a coup are clear when power is concentrated in a small elite. We abstract away from the planning, decision-making, and risk taking of the coup maker and concentrate instead on the elite whose cooperation is necessary to sustain a coup or to sustain a leader.
The game is played over an inde nite number of periods. The set of players consists of a dictator and an in nite supply of kingmakers, n of whom are active and own equal shares in an export rm in any given period. At the beginning of each period, the players observe the random price of the export. This price, p, is independent and identically distributed each period according to a distribution function F whose support is 0; 1). At the beginning of each period, the dictator receives a xed rent, W , from the citizens, sees the price, p, and chooses how much e ort, x 2 0; 1], to exert on a public good that positively a ects the pro ts of the export rm 4 . The period payo 5 to a dictator who chooses x is W ? C(x) where C : 0; 1] ! < + is an increasing, convex, non-negative, real-valued function with C(0) = 0. The lifetime payo to a dictator is the discounted sum of the period payo s from the period of initial incumbency up to and including the rst period in which kingmakers decide to stage a coup against the dictator. In each period, subsequent to observing the dictator's e ort and the price of exports, 3 For example, Margaret Thatcher's exit as leader of Britain was due to the loss of support of her party. 4 The theorem and proofs remain with slight alteration if we assume that the rent W also depends on the price p.
5 In Ferejohn, the o ce holder sees a random variable and then decides how much e ort to exert on the voters' behalf. The cost to the o ce holder of exerting e ort is ( ). The o ce holder receives W ? (a) if the o ce holder exerts e ort a while in o ce. the active group of kingmakers decides whether to stage a coup that overthrows the dictator. A coup is staged only if each active kingmaker chooses to stage a coup. The kingmakers receive period dividends that depend negatively on the probability of a coup and positively on both the exogenous price of the export and the e ort expended by the dictator. (Alternatively, the exogenous uctuations in the kingmakers' payo s could be due to changes in weather or tastes, for example.) If the kingmakers stage a coup, the dictator is replaced by a randomly chosen active kingmaker who is, in turn, replaced by an inactive kingmaker; each active kingmaker's payo in this period is 0. If the kingmakers do not stage a coup, each active kingmaker's period payo 6 is pY (x)=n where Y : 0; 1] ! < + is an increasing, concave, non-negative, real-valued function with Y (0) = 0. Inactive kingmakers have no decisions to make and earn 0 each period. The lifetime payo of an active kingmaker is the discounted sum of the period payo s that the kingmaker receives while active, plus the expected pro ts that the kingmaker receives if chosen to be dictator after a coup is staged. The common discount factor is 2 (0; 1).
Equilibrium
We require unanimity among the homogeneous active kingmakers when a coup is staged, so that, in essence, we have two players, a representative kingmaker and a dictator. Formally, the game is stochastic in nature. The payo s to the active players in each period are determined solely by the observed price and current actions so that the past does not in uence the current opportunity set directly. After seeing the price, the dictator chooses a level of e ort. After seeing the price and the e ort level, the representative kingmaker decides on whether or not to stage a coup. As past behavior and price do not a ect the future price, we look for an equilibrium strategy pro le in which the prescription of the strategy in period i depends only on observables in period i. That is, we look for a Markov strategy pro le in which the state is the current price. A Markov strategy for a dictator is a function X : 0; 1) ! 0; 1] that transforms prices into exertion levels. A Markov strategy for an active kingmaker is a function S : 0; 1) 0; 1] ! f0;1g that transforms the current price and exertion level into a decision to stage a coup (denoted by 1) or not to stage a coup (denoted by 0) 7 . The model has a multitude of Markov equilibria, including one in which the representative kingmaker always chooses to stage a coup and the dictator exerts zero e ort. We show that there is only one equilibrium outcome that is a Markov subgame-perfect symmetric Nash equilibrium outcome. Predictions based on the Markov subgame-perfect symmetric Nash equilibrium outcome are consistent with the ve stylized facts on leadership turnover given above.
Since only the current price directly in uences Markov strategies in each subgame, if all other players use Markov strategies then a player has a best response that is also a Markov strategy. Thus, a Markov subgame-perfect equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the game in which players are not restricted to Markov strategies. (See Fudenberg and Tirole (1992, ch. 13) for more discussion of Markov perfect equilibria.)
As stated in Abreu (1988) , in a repeated game with discounting, a strategy pro le is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if no player can gain by deviating in a single period after any history. (The idea comes from the principle of dynamic programming called \unimprovability". For a proof of the statement, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1992, Theorem 4.2, p. 110) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 153) .) This result applies to our game. Thus, in checking whether a pair (X; S) of Markov strategies is a subgame perfect equilibrium we can restrict attention to alternative strategies that di er from a player's designated strategy only in the actions prescribed in any one period.
The best response function of an active kingmaker
We begin with the best response function of an active kingmaker. An active kingmaker's payo in any period depends positively on both the dictator's e ort and the price. This has two implications for an active kingmaker's best response function. If an active kingmaker's best response is to stage a coup for some exertion level x when facing a given price p, then the kingmaker's best response is to stage a coup for any exertion level less than x. If an active kingmaker's best response is to stage a coup for some price p and exertion level x, then the kingmaker's best response is to stage a coup for any price less than p when facing x. Thus, when facing a price p and a strategy X of the dictator, there is a reservation function R k (X; p), with R k non-increasing in p such that only for x < R k (X; p) does the active kingmaker strictly prefer to stage a coup.
What is an active kingmaker's optimal reservation standard when a dictator exerts e ort x and the price is p? If the active kingmakers choose not to stage a coup and thereby maintain the status quo, then each active kingmaker earns pY (x)=n from exports in this period and expects to earn E(K) in the ensuing periods where K represents the present value of an active kingmaker's maximum expected earnings and E denotes the expectation operator over p 2 0; 1). The bene t of remaining as kingmaker or equivalently, the opportunity cost of a coup is therefore (pY (x)=n) + E(K). If the active kingmakers choose to stage a coup and thereby take an opportunity to change status, then each active kingmaker earns zero this period. In the subsequent period, each active kingmaker remains an active kingmaker with probability (n ? 1)=n and changes status by becoming a dictator with probability 1=n. Thus, when the active kingmakers choose to stage a coup, each active kingmaker earns E(K)(n ? 1)=n] + E(D)=n] (which represents the expected capital gain of changing status and so is the bene t of a coup) where D represents the present value of a dictator's maximum earnings. An active kingmaker chooses to stage a coup when the expected capital gain of a change in status (the bene t of a coup) is greater than the bene t of remaining as kingmaker (the opportunity cost of a coup). Formally, an active kingmaker's maximization problem is a dynamic programming problem for which the Bellman equation is
Subgame perfection requires that each active kingmaker choose to stage a coup whenever the opportunity cost of a coup (the bene t of remaining as kingmaker) is less than the bene t of a coup (the expected capital gain of a change in status)
) and to avert a coup whenever the opportunity cost is greater than the bene t (i.e. 
We call such a strategy a reservation strategy with reservation standard function
Note that the active kingmakers' variable reservation standard decreases in p since Y is increasing in e ort. That is, the e ort required of the dictator to avert a coup decreases in p. The intuition for this fact is as follows. The active kingmakers' variable reservation standard is the level of e ort exerted by the dictator that maintains equality between the bene t and cost of a coup. The bene t of a coup to an active kingmaker derives from the chance to become a dictator tomorrow. The bene t of being a dictator tomorrow derives from the stream of future export prices and so is independent of the present price. The variable reservation standard of e ort maintains equality between the variable opportunity cost of a coup and the xed bene t. The opportunity cost of a coup is essentially the product of the export price and the e ort exerted by the dictator. The kingmakers' reservation standard is the quanity of e ort that exactly compensates the kingmakers for a change in price. As the export price decreases, the compensating quantity of e ort must increase so that the reservation standard decreases in price.
The best response function of a dictator
As the only feasible Markov subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of an active kingmaker is a reservation strategy in which the reservation standard decreases in p, we need to nd the best response of a dictator to strategies of this kind. Suppose that a dictator faces a reservation strategy of the active kingmakers that has the variable reservation standard r k (p) where r k decreases in p. A dictator's payo depends negatively on the dictator's e ort and on the probability that there is a coup. The probability of a coup is one unless the dictator exerts e ort greater than or equal to the variable reservation standard. This implies that the dictator's best response is either to exert zero e ort or to meet the variable reservation standard. However, the kingmakers' variable reservation standard decreases in the export price. Thus, a dictator's best response to a decreasing reservation standard of the kingmakers is to exert zero e ort unless the reservation standard is low enough, or equivalently, unless the export price is high enough. When the kingmakers' variable reservation standard is low enough (that is, the export price is high enough) the dictator exerts the minimum e ort necessary to avoid a coup. Formally, a dictator's best response to the representative kingmaker's reservation strategy with reservation standard r k (p) is a reservation strategy with reservation value R d (r k (p)) of the form
in which the dictator averts a coup when the price is high enough. The interpretation of the dictator's reservation strategy is as follows. The dictator's payo depends on the xed rents W , the e ort exerted, and on the probability that there is a coup. The probability that there is a coup equals zero if the e ort exerted is greater than or equal to the kingmakers' reservation standard; otherwise, it equals one. Thus, there is a maximum level of e ort that the dictator is willing to exert. The maximum level, R d (r k ), is independent of current prices. The dictator strictly prefers to exert the minimum e ort required to avert a coup if the minimum e ort required is less than R d (r k ). The dictator strictly prefers to exert zero e ort and be deposed rather than to exert e ort greater than R d (r k ) and remain as dictator. The dictator is indi erent between exerting the minimum e ort and zero e ort if the minimum e ort equals R d (r k ); we assume that the dictator exerts the minimum e ort in this case (though the results remain if the dictator randomizes between the minimum e ort and zero e ort). We are now in a position to calculate the dictator's optimal reservation value R d (r k ) in response to the kingmakers' reservation strategy that has reservation value r k .
The incumbent dictator wants to maximize lifetime earnings and faces the price p this period. If the dictator exerts zero e ort, then a coup is staged and the dictator earns W in this period and zero ever after. If the dictator exerts e ort r k (p), a coup is averted, and the dictator earns W ? C(r k (p)) in this period and then continues as dictator in the next period. The dictator exerts the required e ort when the kingmakers' variable reservation standard is lower than the maximum e ort that the dictator is willing to make given W and the future bene t of remaining as dictator. Formally, the maximization problem that the dictator faces is a stationary dynamic programming problem for which the Bellman equation is 
The trigger price associated with a pair of best response functions
We know that when a dictator uses a reservation strategy with reservation value The intuition is as follows. As the price increases the opportunity cost of a coup increases for any xed e ort exerted by the dictator. Since the kingmakers' reservation standard maintains equality between the xed bene t and the cost of a coup, the kingmakers' variable reservation standard increases as the price decreases. For prices above T (r d ), the value of the kingmakers' optimal reservation standard function is less than or equal to the dictator's reservation value so that the dictator exerts the e ort required by the kingmakers. Thus, for prices above the trigger, the kingmakers reservation standard is met and therefore the the ow of bene ts from remaining as kingmaker (i.e. the opportunity cost of a coup) is high relative to the xed bene t (i.e. the expected capital gain of a change in status) so that no coup is staged. For prices below T (r d ), the value of the kingmakers' optimal reservation standard function is greater than the dictator's reservation value so that the dictator exerts zero e ort. Thus, for prices below the trigger, the kingmakers' reservation standard is not met and therefore the ow of bene ts from remaining as kingmaker is low relative to the expected capital gain of a change in status so that a coup is staged. Given a dictator's reservation value r d , the trigger price associated the representative kingmaker's best response is
10 If the probability of success of a coup attempt were less than 1 then the kingmaker's reservation value would be lower and the trigger price would be lower. However, the basic insight remains. Coups occur when prices are low enough.
Equilibrium
Now that we have winnowed the feasible equilibrium strategy pro les to be reservation strategy pro les 11 , we look for a pair of reservation strategies such that each is a best response to the other. The dictator's equilibrium strategy X (p) is a reservation strategy with the following properties: exert e ort 0 if the price p < T (r d ), the equilibrium trigger price; exert e ort r k (p) (the kingmakers' equilibrium reservation standard), if the price p T (r d ), the equilibrium trigger price. The kingmakers' equilibrium strategy S (p; x) is a reservation strategy with the following properties: stage a coup if the dictator's e ort x < r k (p), the kingmakers' equilibrium reservation standard; maintain the status quo if the dictator's e ort x r k (p), the kingmakers' equilibrium reservation standard. The theorem below states the unique equilibrium values for the trigger price, the kingmakers' reservation standard, the dictator's reservation value, and the lifetime equilibrium payo s. 
The present value of an active kingmaker's equilibrium lifetime earnings is E(K ) = E(D ) n(1 ? ) + : 11 We cannot tie down the dictator's strategy exactly at p such that r k (p) = R d (r k (p)) since any distribution over fr k (p); 0g is a best response of the dictator and the kingmakers' best response is not dependent on the dictator's strategy in this case.
Proof. See the Appendix 12 . Our model has a unique kingmaker-symmetric Markov subgame perfect equilibrium. In equilibrium, the dictator is ousted whenever the export price is below some trigger price. The intuition is simple. The gain to a dictator of exerting the e ort required to avert a coup instead of exerting zero e ort depends only on the e ort exerted and not on the price in the period. The bene t of staying on as dictator depends only on future prices. Thus, there is a maximum level of e ort that the dictator is willing to exert that depends on the gains to staying on as dictator relative to the cost of exerting e ort. The dictator's reservation level of e ort is independent of price. The expected gain to a kingmaker of staging a coup derives from the chance of becoming a dictator next period. The expected capital gain of a change in status does not depend on the current price so that the bene t of staging a coup is xed. The costs of staging a coup this period are the lost pro ts from exports. The lost pro ts depend positively on the price of exports and the e ort exerted by the dictator. For each price there is a reservation standard of e ort that keeps each kingmaker indi erent between staging a coup and not staging a coup. As the price of exports decreases, the kingmakers' reservation standard of e ort increases. When the price decreases, the reservation standard of e ort increases so as to compensate the kingmakers for the decrease in price. In particular, when the price is low enough, the kingmakers' reservation standard required to avert a coup is greater than the dictator's reservation level, the maximum e ort that the dictator is willing to exert. When the price is low enough, the dictator is not willing to exert the relatively high level of e ort. In this case, the opportunity cost of staging a coup is lower than the xed bene t of not staging a coup and a coup is optimal. Unlike the assumptions in previous political electoral and dictatorship models of leadership turnover, we assume that the members of the subgroup (kingmakers) whose support is necessary for the leader (dictator) to stay in power have a chance at becoming the leader (the dictator) when there is turnover. In previous electoral models of political competition, the voters vote against a candidate who is perceived to be less able to provide them with goods. In our framework, kingmakers might withhold support in order to punish a dictator for not providing e ort. In addition, the kingmakers might withhold support in order to seize the opportunity to become the dictator when it is relatively cheaper to do so.
Comparative Statics
In equilibrium a coup occurs only when the price is below the equilibrium trigger price
Therefore, the probability that a coup occurs in a period is the probability that the price is less than or equal to the equilibrium trigger price. Thus, coups follow a binomial distribution for which the equilibrium probability that a coup occurs in any period is F (T (C ?1 ( E(D )))). As the trigger price increases, a coup is more likely to occur in any given period. We now use Theorem 1 to provide two comparative static results.
Corollary 5.1. If the ow of bene ts from remaining as kingmaker increases (i.e. the opportunity cost of a coup increases), then the equilibrium probability that a coup occurs in any period decreases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, as the kingmakers' payo s in the event of a coup (Y ) increases or the cost to the dictator of exerting e ort (C) decreases, the ow of bene ts from remaining as kingmaker increases relative to the xed expected capital gain of a change in status so that the probability of a coup goes down. Thus, a prediction of the model is that as real GDP increases, the probability of a coup decreases.
We next consider the implications of increasing the size of the group of active kingmakers. Corollary 5.2. As the number n of active kingmakers increases, the equilibrium expected lifetime payo s of the dictator, E(D ), and of the representative kingmaker, E(K ), decrease and the equilibrium probability that a coup occurs in any period increases.
This result follows from the fact that the spoils of dictatorship W remain xed as n, the size of the subgroup, increases. To avert a coup, the dictator must transfer a portion of W (in the form of e ort that a ects the level of the public good) to the set of active kingmakers. As n increases, for each price, the portion of W required to avert a coup by n kingmakers increases so that it is now more likely to be above the dictator's reservation level of e ort. This implies that the probability of a coup increases and the payo s of both the dictator and representative kingmaker decrease.
Declining Hazard Rate
In the basic model, the probability that a coup occurs (also known as the hazard rate) is the probability that the price is less than the trigger price. Since the trigger price depends on the dictator's cost of exerting e ort and the price in each period is independently drawn from a common distribution, the length of a dictator's term in o ce cannot a ect the trigger price and so cannot a ect the hazard rate in the basic model. However, the stylized fact in the leadership turnover literature is that the hazard rate declines with the length of term in o ce. One explanation of the declining hazard rate (proposed by Bienen and van de Walle (1991)) is variable innate ability: if leaders di er in ability, then it would be expected that those of lower ability would be weeded out rst. In common with the literature, we formalize variable ability as follows. We assume that, for each potential dictator, the cost of e ort (to maintain the public good that enhances the well-being of the subgroup) is either high or low. (The results hold if we assume any nite number or continuum of costs of e ort.) In theorem D.1 in the appendix we show that, in this case, there exists a unique symmetric Markov subgame perfect equilibrium, which has the following properties.
As in the basic model, the kingmakers' equilibrium strategy is a reservation strategy. For each price, the kingmakers' reservation standard function is independent of the dictator in power and decreases in price. The kingmakers' reservation standard is the level of dictatorial e ort that o sets the change in price. The compensating level of e ort increases as the price decreases so that the kingmakers' reservation standard increases as the price decreases.
The equilibrium strategy of a dictator of type i = 1; 2 is to meet the representative kingmaker's reservation value whenever this is low enough relative to the cost of exerting e ort. The dictator who faces the lower cost of e ort has the higher reservation value. Thus, for each type of dictator, there is a trigger price such that if the price falls below a dictator's trigger price, the compensating amount of e ort required by the kingmakers' reservation standard is so high that no e ort is exerted and the kingmakers' expected capital gain from a change in status is higher than the ow of bene ts from maintaining the status quo so that a coup is staged; if the price rises above a dictator's trigger price, the compensating amount of e ort is low enough that the dictator exerts the required e ort and so a coup is averted. The lower is the dictator's cost of e ort, the higher is the dictator's reservation value, and so the lower is the dictator's trigger price.
In equilibrium, when the price is low enough in a period, neither type of dictator exerts the required high level of e ort, so that both types of dictator are ousted from power; when the export price is in some intermediate range, only the dictator who faces the high cost of e ort exerts less than the intermediate level of e ort required and is ousted; when the price is high enough, both types of dictator exert the required low level of e ort and no coup is staged. We can now use the fact that the dictator who faces the lower cost of e ort has the lower trigger price to prove the following result.
Theorem 6.1. The longer is a dictator's term in o ce, the lower is the probability of a coup in any given period.
Proof. See the Appendix. This result is driven by the fact that when there are two types of dictator, there are two reservation values and so two trigger prices. The lower is the dictator's cost of e ort, the lower is the dictator's trigger price. The higher trigger price triggers a coup when the dictator who faces the higher cost of e ort (and has the lower reservation value) is in power. Only the lower trigger price triggers a coup when the dictator who faces the lower cost of e ort (and has the higher reservation value) is in power. The longer is a dictator's term in o ce, the higher is the probability that a price lower than the higher trigger price has occurred during the term. This implies that the longer is the dictator's term in o ce, the higher is the probability that the dictator has the higher reservation value. It follows that the longer is the dictator's term in o ce, the lower is the probability that there is a coup in the next period.
Analogous results hold if the set of types of dictator is any nite set or an interval. In equilibrium, each active kingmaker uses a reservation strategy with a reservation standard that decreases in price and depends on the expected capital gain of changing status and becoming a dictator of unknown type but is independent of the type of dictator currently in power. Each type of dictator exerts the e ort required whenever it is low enough relative to the cost of exerting e ort. Thus, for each type of dictator, there is an associated trigger price that decreases as the type increases and the result follows. The trigger price increases as the cost of e ort increases across the di erent types.
Conclusion
Our model predicts that the longer is a dictator's term in o ce, the lower is the probability of a coup next period. Bienen and van de Walle (1991) nd that the length of time in o ce inversely a ects the probability of leadership turnover in any given year. That is, the evidence in Bienen and van de Walle (1991) is consistent with our model.
We nd that as the technology for providing the public good improves, the less likely is leadership turnover to occur. Poole (1990, 1992) nd evidence that low per capita lagged real GDP growth is associated with a high coup propensity in a given period. If the rate of per capita real GDP growth is an indicator of the productiveness of an economy, then this result is consistent with the evidence in Poole (1990, 1992) .
We show that coups occur in the model when kingmakers' earnings are low in any period. Gallego (1996) nds that low per capita lagged real investment is associated with a high coup propensity in a given period. If the rate of per capita real investment is an indicator of the per capita earnings of kingmakers then this evidence is consistent with our model.
We obtain that as the size of the subgroup of kingmakers increases, the more likely is leadership turnover to occur in any period. Essentially, the dictator and kingmakers are sharing a xed pie. As the number of kingmakers increases, each individual kingmaker's share of the xed pie decreases and so the cost of a coup to each kingmaker decreases. Thus, the probability of a coup increases as the number of kingmakers increases. Bienen and van de Walle (1991, p. 80) nd evidence that low risk of leadership turnover occurs in nonelectoral regions. If the subgroup associated with a leader in an electoral system is on average larger than that associated with a nonelectoral system, then this evidence supports our result. Blondel (1980, p.220, 230) has some evidence on long leadership that also supports our result. Blondel de nes as long leadership, a period in o ce of a decade or more held in one continuous stretch or in two more periods. In the period from 1945 to 1975, one sixth of the political leaders exhibit long leadership. However, the percentage of types of leaders who experience long leadership are as follows: 68% of monarchs, 58% of founders of states, 41% of communist leaders, 19% of military leaders, 6% of all other forms. If the subgroup supporting that of a monarch and communist leader is smaller than that supporting a democratically elected leader, then this evidence is also consistent with our result.
Another prediction of the model is that an observable negative exogenous shock increases the probability that a coup occurs if the shock is large enough and if the welfare of the kingmakers is dependent on the value of the exogenous parameter. If the data exhibit e ects of negative observable exogenous shocks on coups d' etat then our model can explain the phenomenon. The equilibrium probability of a coup in any period is the probability that the price is below the trigger price. To prove that the probability of a coup increases, it su ces to prove that the trigger price increases in n. By theorem 4.1, the equilibrium trigger price is ). This inequality holds for two reasons. The rst is that since a dictator of type 1 faces lower costs than those faced by one of type 2, the payo associated with any particular choice is higher for a dictator of type 1 than for one of type 2. This implies that a dictator of type 1 does at least as well as one of type 2 when facing the kingmakers' equilibrium strategy so that E(D ))) in some period, a dictator who exerts the e ort required to avoid a coup is revealed to be of type 1. In this case, the probability that a coup occurs in the next period is F (T ((C Thus, if a dictator has been in power n periods, the conditional probability that the price is below T ((C This implies that the longer that a dictator has been in o ce, the more likely it is that the price in at least one period fell below T ((C 2 ) ?1 ( E(D 2 ))), and the higher is the conditional probability that the dictator is of type 1. That is, the longer a dictator remains in o ce, the lower is the probability that there is a coup.
